NEW JERSEY AND THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE
Robert A. Diab*
In many areas of the law, including property law in general, there
has been a high degree of uniformity, due, in large measure, to the
existence of a common law, which in most basic areas has been stated
effectively and in considerable detail by the American Law Institute's
Restatements of the Law. These have been cited and relied on by the
courts of most jurisdictions, including New Jersey.'
Yet there has never been a restatement of the law of succession,
simply because one was impossible. There is no such thing as an AngloAmerican common law of wills. The English law on the subject was
not adopted in this country since it was clearly unsuitable in the areas
of intestate succession as well as administration of estates, both of which
developed in a context of separate court systems having jurisdiction
over decedents' personalty and realty. 2 Consequently we have fifty

3
different statutory systems with wide variations.
In a mobile society such as ours, this can and does result in serious
inconvenience to a testator and hardship to an intestate's heirs. Thus,
for example, due to New Jersey's rigid conflict of laws rule that the
validity of a will of personalty is governed by the law of the testator's
domicile at the time of his death, 4 a testator bringing his unattested
holographic will from California and dying shortly after he has estabProfessor of Law, Seton Hall University, School of Law.
1 See, e.g., the almost extravagant praise by Vice Chancellor Bigelow in United States

Trust Co. v. Montclair Trust Co., 133 NJ. Eq. 579, 582, 33 A.2d 901, 903 (Ch. 1943): "The Restatement of Law: Property, contains in chapter 25 a brilliant exposition of the law
relating to powers of appointment."
2 The ecclesiastical courts decided cases involving the distribution and use of personal property, while the common law courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the descent
and use of land. This division of jurisdiction also accounts for the distinct terminology
of decedents' estates which survives today. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, THE HIsTORY OF

ENGLISH LAw 331-33 (2d ed. 1909).
3 For an exhaustive and analytical survey, see Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA.
L. REv. 613 and 856 (1960).
4 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Stevens, 28 N.J. 243, 146 A.2d 97 (1958). Fortunately, this
rule has been modified by the majority of states which provide that a will executed elsewhere, when in writing and subscribed by the testator, is legally effective if executed in
the manner prescribed by the local law or by the law either of the place of execution or
of the testator's domicile at the time of execution. Rees, supra note 3, at 906. The Uniform Probate Code has a similar provision; see § 2-506. See also Fratcher, The Uniform
Probate Code and the InternationalWill, 66 MICH. L. Rev. 469 (1968).
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lished a domicile in New Jersey without having revisited a lawyer or
acquainted himself with our wills act will have died intestate. Likewise, if our testator dying in New Jersey owns real property in Florida,
his will containing a devise of such property would also have to conform to the wills act of Florida, since the validity of a will of5 real
property is determined by the law of the situs of such property.
Again, the very concept of domicile is often uncertain and difficult
to determine in some circumstances, so that a comparatively young
person who has been transferred in his employment or who has voluntarily left his original state of domicile to seek employment elsewhere and who dies intestate may have his dependents' shares seriously
affected according to which state is determined to be his domicile at
death.
A measure of uniformity of legislation was attempted in the publication in 1946 of an unofficial Model Probate Code, which apparently
influenced legislation in some thirteen states." Obviously the impact
of the Code was sufficiently minimal to warrant a renewed effort in
1962 by the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law to cooperate with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in revising the Model Probate
Code and existing uniform laws in the field into a single code to be
enacted by all of the states. The Uniform Probate Code was the result.
It was completed and promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association in August
1969, and published in an official version in March

1970.7

The Code is a monumental work in the breadth of its coverage,
dealing not only with the substantive and procedural law of succession
but also with problems of fiduciary administration, including the
powers and duties of executors, administrators, trustees of living and
testamentary trusts, and conservators of property of infants and incompetents.
Besides producing a needed uniformity, the Code was conceived
5 In re McDougal, 49 N.J. Super. 485, 140 A.2d 249 (Cty. Ct., P. Div. 1958), aff'd mem.,
55 N.J. Super. 36, 149 A.2d 801 (App. Div.), aff'd mem., 29 N.J. 586, 151 A.2d 540 (1959).
See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 249 (1934).
6 See Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration Under the Uniform Probate
Code, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 5 (1971). Professor Fratcher was a Reporter for the Uniform
Probate Code and, with Professor Wellman, the Chief Reporter, prepared the initial
drafts of major portions of the Code. Most of them are described in Fratcher, Toward
Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1037 (1966).
7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: OFFICIAL TExT WITH COMMENTS (West 1970) (hereinafter
cited as UPC).
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of as an instrument of reform.8 The probate institutions of most states
had become the objects of widespread criticism not only by private
individuals who might have been accused of a certain self-interest, 9
but also by public figures.' 0 The growing concern of the legal profession at such criticism was reflected in the wide participation of lawyers
across the country over many years in bringing about an officially approved code which it was hoped would be considered for adoption in the
several states."
A comparison of the present probate law of New Jersey with the
Uniform Probate Code thus becomes both appropriate and useful. In
some areas there is bound to be a similarity in the laws. Where there
is a substantial difference, change, if it is desirable, would come with
greater difficulty, since lawyers engaged in estate practice appear, at
least to the writer, to be somewhat traditionalistic and skeptical about
change. However, the Legislature would be remiss if it refused at
least to consider the adoption of the Code.
Because of the size of the Code and the complexity of its concepts,
it is proposed in this paper to deal only with the substantive law of
succession, leaving the process of probate administration for a later
article.
INTESTATE

SUCCESSION

Descent and Distribution
In its introductory comment to this area the Code states that it
"attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to
disposition of his property at death, and for this purpose the prevailing
patterns in wills are useful in determining what the owner who fails
to execute a will would probably want."' 12 That is, or should be, the
primary function of intestate laws, which are almost wholly statutory.
The most usual type of statute specifies the order in which certain
designated classes of relatives are to take and then provides for the
8 See Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970).
9 The much publicized criticism by Mr. Dacey in his book, How TO Avowo PROBATE
(1965), was somewhat neutralized by the disclosures of his personal interest in advocating
the creation of "Dacey Trusts" by the use of mutual funds of which he was a salesman. See
Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 135, 222 A.2d 339, 343 (1966), appeal dismissed,
386 U.S. 683 (1967).

10 The late Senator Robert Kennedy in his successful campaign for the office of
United States Senator from New York criticized the scandal connected with the New York
Surrogates' Courts, mainly in the form of patronage and excessive fees (one lawyer receiving $1000 from an estate valued at only $1400). N.Y. Times, June 22, 1966, at 43, col. 2.
11 See Wellman, supra note 8, passim.
12 UPC, art. 2, pt. 1, General Comment.

SETON HALL LAW-REVIEW

[Vol. 2:323

remaining cases by declaring that the property shall go to the "next of
kin" or those closest related by degree to the decedent. 13 Under most
statutes, including New Jersey's, the nearest of kin are permitted to
take regardless of how remotely related to the intestate they might be.
This practice has been criticized as giving rise to the "laughing heir"
or remote relative who might have had little or no contact with, or
14
regard for, the decedent.
The Code resolves this problem by limiting inheritance to collateral relatives descended from the grandparents of the intestate, thus
eliminating more remote relatives tracing through great-grandparents,
such as second cousins or a great-uncle. 15 This, it is said, simplifies
proof of heirship and is in line with more modern policy.' 6
On another general note, the Code differs fundamentally from
New Jersey law. Indicating that it is no longer meaningful to have
different patterns of succession for real and personal property, the
Code adopts a single table for descent and distribution.' 7 New Jersey,
13

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-5 (1953):
If there be no husband or widow, child or any legal representative of a child,
nor a parent, brother or sister, nor a legal representative of any brother or sister,
then the intestate's property, real and personal, shall descend and be distributed
equally to the next of kindred, in equal degree, of or unto the intestate and their
legal representatives. Representatives of ancestors nearest in degree to the decedent shall take to the exclusion of representatives of ancestors more remote in
degree.
The last sentence of the statute, it has been indicated, gives rise to the "parentelic"
method of ascertaining the next of kin, rather than the "civil law" method, used by most
states, under which the next of kin are computed by degrees, each generation between
the intestate and the possible claimant, counting through their common ancestor, being
one degree. Thus under the parentelic method a cousin, whose common ancestor with
the intestate is their grandfather, would take to the exclusion of a great-uncle, whose
common ancestor with the intestate is the latter's great-grandfather-even though they
are both of the fourth degree from the intestate and would therefore take equally under
the civil law method. "This seems just. A person is more apt to know and therefore to
want to provide for the lines of descent closer to him." In re Wolbert, 47 NJ. Super. 120,
123, 135 A.2d 533, 534 (App. Div. 1957) (quoting Foreword to Title 3A of NJ. STAT. ANN.
(1953)).
14 Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20 IOWA L.
REv.203 (1935).
15 UPC §§ 2-103 and 2-105.
16 The Code follows the New York statute in this respect. See N.Y. EST., PowERs &
TRusrs LAW § 4-1.1(a)(8) (McKinney 1967). Some of the more recent statutes confine the
right of intestate succession to a restricted group of relatives, with the property escheating
to the state thereafter. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-509 (1964) (inheritance restricted to
sixth degree by civil law method); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 3-104 (1969 repl.) (fifth degree by
canon law method (under which the number of degrees was computed by counting down
from the common ancestor to the collateral-a system used originally by the ecclesiastical
courts to determine prohibited degrees of consanguinity in marriage)).
17 UPC § 2-101. This is in line with the policy of the more recent statutes. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEM. STAT. § 29-3 (1966 repl.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970);
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on the other hand, following the English historical pattern, has a
different scheme for the descent of real property and the distribution
of personalty in one instance, namely, where the intestate is
survived by a spouse and issue. 18 But for the existence of dower and
curtesy, which is probably the reason for the disparity, the writer
agrees that the Code would provide a simpler and more sensible rule
by having all property not disposed of by a decedent's will pass to his
heirs in the same manner.
How, then, is the property of an intestate to be distributed? The
Code appears to give the surviving spouse a larger share than most
existing statutes of descent and distribution. The basic scheme is to
give all estates up to $50,000 to the spouse and to divide the balance,
half to the spouse and half to the issue, or, if there is no surviving
issue, then the other half of the balance to the intestate's parent or
parents equally. 19 In this last situation, New Jersey is more generous
to the surviving spouse, giving him or her the entire estate when there
is no surviving issue, 20 whereas the Code does so only when there
is neither issue nor parent of the intestate. 21 Otherwise the share that
the New Jersey statute gives to the spouse seems disproportionately
small compared to that given to the surviving children; for example,
it is less than one-half of that given to a sole surviving child who
would obtain two-thirds of the personalty and the entire real prop22
erty subject only to the spouse's right of dower or curtesy.
In indicating the Code's rationale of such a scheme of distribution, the Comment states that it reflects the desires of most married
persons, who almost always leave all of a moderate estate or at least
one-half of a larger estate to the surviving spouse when a will is executed. It has been pointed out that recent surveys of the characteristics of decedents who leave wills indicate that testators with estates
N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUsTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967, Supp. 1970), especially Commentary at 479.
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-2 (1953):
The real property shall descend to the intestate's children and such persons
as legally represent any child who may have died, subject to the rights or estate
of the intestate's husband or widow . . . under curtesy or dower or any marriage
settlement.
One-third of the personal property shall be distributed to the intestate's
husband or widow . . . and the residue in equal portions among the intestate's
children and such persons as legally represent any child who may have died.
19 UPC §§ 2-102 and 2-103. A distinction is made where there is any issue of decedent
by another spouse, in which case all surviving issue receive one-half of the estate, without
any initial deduction for the spouse. § 2-102(4).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-3 (1953).

21 UPC § 2-102(1).
22 See note 18 supra.
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under $60,000 usually leave their entire property to their spouses.2
Thus, it is contended, the pattern of dividing property between spouse
and issue which is characteristic of most statutes is patently obsolete,
except in the case of large estates where federal taxes have a considerable impact. 24 This may be a difficult proposition to sell to legis25
lators.
Under both the Code and New Jersey law, if there is no surviving
spouse the entire estate passes to the issue of the decedent per stirpes,26
so that where children and grandchildren who are children of a predeceased child of the intestate survive, the grandchildren take the
share that their ancestor would have taken had he survived the intestate.27 In this connection the Code, like the statutes of many states,

specifically provides that where the surviving issue are all of the same
28
degree of kinship to the decedent they take equally or per capita.
This provision, absent in New Jersey's statutory scheme, is a desirable
one since, where the intestate is survived by grandchildren or by nephews and nieces who are descended from different ancestors, some courts
have construed their statutes as requiring a stirpital distribution while
29
other courts have permitted the distributees to take per capita.
23 Fratcher, supra note 6, at 6.
24 Wellman, Selected Aspects of Uniform Probate Code, 3 REAL PROP., PROBATE &
TRusT J. 199, 204 (1968). The author relies on a statistical study of the transmission
of wealth at death made in Cook County, Illinois in the years 1953 and 1957, found
in Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. Cn. L. REv. 241 (1963), as well as on a study of estates in Cuyahoga County, Ohio
in 1965 undertaken by a group of sociologists and lawyers, amplified by personal interviews of the survivors.
25 On the generally accepted theory that when a person dies intestate the law
should try to provide for the distribution of his estate in a manner he would most
likely have effected if he had made a will, quantitative research based on experience
can be most helpful in the legislative process. See Dunham, supra note 24. A study of
probate proceedings as well as the incidence of testate and intestate succession and the
relative sizes of such estates in a county such as Essex with its wide diversity of wealth
might prove extremely useful.
26 UPC § 2-103(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-4 (1953).
27 The Code explicitly defines taking by representation in such a way as to avoid the
result of the famous case of Maud v. Catherwood, 67 Cal. App. 2d 636, 155 P.2d 111
(Dist. Ct. App. 1945), which divided the estate at the level of the four predeceased
children of the decedent, rather than at the level of the grandchildren, some of whom
were living and others of whom had died leaving issue. The Code provides that the
first and principal division of the estate is to be with reference to a generation which
includes one or more living members. See UPC § 2-106 and Comment.
28 UPC § 2-103(l).
29 See, e.g., In re McKeon's Estate, 25 Misc. 850, 199 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sur. Ct. 1960); and
In re Nunziato's Estate, 202 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sur. Ct. 1960), both construing N.Y. DEcED. EST.
LAw § 83(6), as amended N.Y. EST., PowERs & TRusTs LAw § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967, Supp.
1970). The question of whether grandchildren who survive the intestate take per stirpes or
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If there is neither surviving spouse nor issue, New Jersey law
provides for distribution equally among the parents and brothers and
sisters or their representatives,"0 whereas the Code gives priority to
the parents of the intestate, the brothers and sisters taking only if no
parent survives. 31 It is difficult to say which would more nearly approximate the wishes of an average decedent. It should be noted that
here also it is specifically provided by the Code that the issue of
brothers and sisters take equally if they are all of the same degree of
kinship to the decedent. A New Jersey court, as a matter of statutory
construction, held for a per stirpes distribution in similar circum32
stances.
That marks the end of the order in which specified classes of relatives are designated to take under New Jersey's intestacy statute, the
final provision giving the property to the intestate's "next of kindred"
in any degree of remoteness.3 3 Under the Code, if there is no surviving
issue, parent or brother or sister or their issue, half of the estate passes
to the paternal grandparents or the survivor of them or to their issue
if both are deceased, and the other half passes to the maternal relatives
in the same manner, with the same scheme of per capita and per
stirpes distribution as in other situations. 34 If there are no grandparents or their descendants (the limit of remoteness) the intestate
estate escheats to the state or such subdivision thereof as the particular
35
jurisdiction might wish to specify.
It is quite apparent, from examining the intestate laws of the
various states, that a wide diversity exists, from the colonial schemes
for descent and distribution to more modern systems adjusted to
current needs.3 6 Thus uniformity of legislation is particularly desirper capita has not been judicially determined in New Jersey, although it has been suggested that by virtue of the statutory language ("to the intestate's children and such
persons as legally represent any child who may have died") they should take per stirpes.
7 A. CLAPP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION § 1591 (3d ed. 1962). In In re Tantum, 97 N.J.
Eq. 271, 127 A. 85 (Prerog. Ct. 1924), it was held, construing the statutory language (to
"brothers and sisters and representatives of deceased's brothers and sisters') that nephews
and nieces, the children of predeceased half-sisters of the intestate, took per stirpes.
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-4 (1953).
31 UPC §§ 2-103(2) and (3).
82 In re Tantum, 97 N.J. Eq. 271, 127 A. 85 (Prerog. Ct. 1924).
33 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-5 (1953), quoted supra note 13.
34 UPC § 2-103(4).
85 UPC § 2-105. See note 16 supra.
386 Compare the somewhat archaic system of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-1 to
64.1-11 (1968 repl.), with the more modem, recently adopted North Carolina statute, N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to 29-30 (1966 repl.). The most innovative changes, which were the
result of an extensive study by an officially appointed commission, are to be found in New
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able in this area to avoid hardships to those dying intestate in a mobile
society.
Special Situations
(a) Advancements. Under the common law as well as by statute
in most states, including New Jersey,"7 a substantial gift by an intestate to any of his issue raises a rebuttable presumption of an advancement. Under this doctrine, a child who has received money or property
from his parent by way of anticipation of his inheritance and who
wishes to share in that parent's intestate estate must agree that the
value of the gift be considered as part of the parent's estate and be
deducted from the child's share of the estate as thus enlarged for the
purpose of determining the intestate shares of all the children. 38 This

requirement of the donee's having to account to the donor's estate for
the value of the gift received as an advancement is called "bringing
the gift into hotchpot." 39
One difficulty that has confronted the courts has been the determination of whether or not the intestate intended a gift to constitute
an advancement or satisfaction of the child's inheritance. For example,
some courts have held that wedding presents were advancements in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. 40 Still others have differed as
to whether or not an expenditure in discharge of a parental duty
41
(for example, the education of a child) is an advancement.
This difficulty is eliminated by the Code which requires written
York's comprehensive ESTATES, PowERs & TRusTs LAW §§ 1-1.1 to 14-3.1 (McKinney 1967),
which undoubtedly influenced the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code.
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-8 (1953).
38 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.10 (1952).
39 The recipient of an advancement cannot be forced into hotchpot. Suppose,
for example, that the decedent's net estate is $10,000, and that he had made advancements of $7,000 to child X, $1,000 to child Y and had given nothing to child Z. When
the amounts of the advancements are added to the estate (making $18,000) and the
estate divided into the proper number of shares (three), each share would amount to
$6,000. Since X has received more than this he would elect not to share in the estate but
rather to retain his gift, since he cannot be forced to account. The new size of the
notional estate would be $11,000 (net estate plus Y's advancement), which would be
divided between Y and Z only. Y, having received $1,000, would take $4,500 more and
Z would receive the full share of $5,500.
40 See, e.g., Wenbert v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 116 Ind. App. 31, 61 N.E.2d
466 (1945), where the court held the burden was on the daughter to show that a wedding
present of shares of stock of the value of $5,700 was intended as a gift and not as an
advancement by her intestate father.
41 Compare In re Denison's Estate, 157 Misc. 385, 284 N.Y.S. 705 (Sur. Ct. 1935) (no
advancement), with Hill's Guardian v. Hill, 122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906) (sums furnished
by father to enable son to obtain a professional education held an advancement).
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evidence of the intent that an inter vivos gift is to be considered an
advancement, by way of a contemporaneous writing by the decedent
or an acknowledgment in writing by the heir. 42 The Comment to the
section explains further that most inter vivos transfers today are intended to be absolute gifts or are carefully integrated into an estate
plan, so that if the donor intends that a lifetime transfer be deducted
from the donee's share of his estate, he may either execute a will so
providing, or indicate the gift is an advancement in writing where he
intends to die intestate.
Another departure of the Code from the common law and most
statutes in this area is that the latter mostly apply to children or other
lineal descendants, 43 whereas the Code applies as well to advances
made to collaterals such as nephews and nieces.44
New Jersey's statute and the Code are similar in declaring that
if the recipient predeceases the intestate, his (the recipient's) issue
presumptively are not to be charged with what he received by way of
advancement, 45 even though the majority rule would seem to be that
the value of the advancement is charged against the share of the issue
of the deceased child when they take per stirpes46 but not when they
47
take per capita.
(b) Half-Bloods, Adopted and Illegitimate Children. At common
law collaterals related by the half-blood, that is where they have but
one common ancestor, could not inherit land, by virtue of the Canons
of Descent. 48 Today no state absolutely excludes the half-blood, although there are statutory variations among some of the states. 49 In
42 UPC § 2-110.
43 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-8 (1953): "If the decedent in his life time shall

have given or advanced any part of his real or personal property to any of his issue .... "
44 The language of the Code refers to property which the intestate gave in his
lifetime "to an heir." UPC § 2-110.
45 UPC § 2-110; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-8 (1953). The proposition stated results from a
construction of the New Jersey statute which aims to provide equality of shares of "issue
in the same degree of consanguinity to the decedent," so that the statute becomes
operative only when the intestate plays favorites with those of equal degree of kinship
with him; he may prefer one of his issue nearer or more remote in degree. The rationale
of this could be that the predeceased child may have spent the advancement or willed
it to some other person, so that his issue would receive no benefit from it and hence
should not be charged with it. See 7 A. CI.APP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION § 1594 (3d
ed. 1962).
48 Coffman v. Coffman, 41 W. Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 29(c)
(1946).
47 Person's Appeal, 74 Pa. 121 (1873).
48 See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 19 (2d ed. 1953).
49 See generally T. ATxINSON, supra note 48.
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most jurisdictions, including New Jersey, 50 relatives of the half-blood
inherit the same share they would if they were of the whole blood. The
Code has a similar provision. 51 It may be stated, in passing, that post52
humous children in practically all states as well as under the Code
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.
There was no adoption at common law. Today statutory procedures for adoption exist in all states. 5 The legislative tendency is to
make adoption the equivalent of natural birth for purposes of inheritance from the adopting parent, so that an adopted child has all the
rights of a lawful natural child, provided he has been properly adopted. 54 In line with modern policy, both the Code and the New Jersey
statute provide that the judgment of adoption terminates the right of
the adopted child to inherit from his natural parents, except that
where the adoption of the child is by the spouse of a natural parent, i.e.,
by a stepfather or stepmother, it has no effect on the relationship
between the child and that natural parent. 55 Many of the provisions
which were changed by the present New Jersey statute dealing with
children, which became effective January 1, 1954, have been retained
in the statute dealing with the adoption of adults. 56
At common law an illegitimate child was nullius filius; he could
not inherit from or through his parents or other ancestors.57 Gradually
statutes or decisions permitted the illegitimate to inherit from his
mother and she from him, as if he were her legitimate child. 58 In ad60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-6 (1953).
51 UPC § 2-107.
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-10 (1953); UPC § 2-108.
63 See C. VERNIER. AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 262-63 (1936); Note, Property Rights
as Affected by Adoption, 25 BROOKLYN L. REV. 231, 242 (1959).
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30(B) (Supp. 1970) effective Jan. 1, 1954. An informal
adoption or the fostering of a child has no effect on the inheritance. Elmer v. Wellbrook,
110 N.J. Eq. 15, 158 A. 760 (Ch. 1932).
55 UPC § 2-109(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-30(A) (Supp. 1970). It has recently been
held that where an adoption was effected under the former law (pre-1954) which saved the
adopted child's inheritance from his natural parent, the present statute was not retroactive inteffect. Nickell v. Gall, 49 N.J. 186, 229 A.2d 511 (1967).
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:22-1 et seq., especially § 2A:22-3 (1952). See generally 7
A. CLAPP, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION § 1599 (3d ed. 1962, Supp. 1969).
57 It should be observed that there is a very strong presumption in favor of the
legitimacy of children born in wedlock. "[T]o establish the illegitimacy of a child born
in wedlock, the proof must be such that 'there is no possible escape' from that conclusion." Jackson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 106 N.J. Super. 61, 75, 254 A.2d 141,
149 (L. Div. 1969), where it was held that the presumption was rebutted by proof of
nonaccess for an unbroken period of 350 days while the father was abroad in the
military service.
58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-7 (1953). See generally C. VERNIER, supra note 53, § 249.

1971]

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

dition a child could be legitimated, so as to inherit from the putative
father, by the subsequent marriage of the parents. That is the position
of the Code.59 However, many states, including New Jersey, require
in addition that the parents recognize and treat him as their child. 60
The Code specifically requires only a ceremonial marriage, even
though the attempted marriage is void, to legitimate the child.,' This
result has been reached in New Jersey by judicial decision construing
the word "marry" in the statute to embrace any ceremonial marriage,
whether valid or not.6 2 The liberal and more enlightened view of the
Code is further reflected in the alternative provision permitting the
child to inherit from his father if paternity is established by an adjudication before the father's death or by clear and convincing proof
thereafter. 3 This is unlike most current statutes.
(c) Simultaneous Death. Under the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act, adopted by New Jersey 64 and many other states, where the
title to property or its devolution depends upon priority of death and
there is no sufficient evidence that the persons involved died otherwise
than simultaneously, the property of each person is disposed of as if
he had survived, unless it is otherwise provided by the will, trust or
other instrument.65 This statute was designed to cover situations where
several members of the same family might be killed in a common
accident, where at common law no presumption was indulged one
66
way or the other.
59 UPC § 2-109(2).
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-7 (1953). See C. VERNIER, supra note 53, §§ 242-43.
61 UPC § 2-109(2)(i).
62 In re Estate of Calogero, 51 N.J. 345, 240 A.2d 429 (1968). The court said that
the relevant statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-7 (1953), when read with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:15-2 (1960), and § 2A:34-20 (1952), made it "clear that the Legislature did not intend
a child's legitimacy to turn upon the validity of his parents' marriage, even if bigamous,
so long as the marriage was ceremonial." Id. at 349, 240 A.2d at 431. The court pointed
out that the courts of some jurisdictions, including New York, have construed theirstatutes more narrowly to require a valid subsequent marriage of the parents.
63 UPC § 2-109(2)(ii). This subsection has a proviso that even if the child's paternity
is established thereunder the father or his kindred may not inherit from or through
the child unless he has openly treated the child as his and has not refused to support
the child.
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:5-1 to 8 (1953), applicable to the estate of any person dying
on or after July 4, 1947.
65 9C UNIFORM LAws ANN. 160-70 (1940).
66 A decision in New Jersey had in effect adopted the same presumption prior to
the statute. See In re LeVan, 123 N.J. Eq. 463, 198 A. 278 (Prerog. Ct. 1938), where it
was held when a testator left his entire estate to a legatee and both died in a common
disaster (multiple murder) and the court was unable to determine which of them
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However, the Act applies only if there is no proof that the parties
died otherwise than simultaneously. For example, if a husband and
wife died, intestate and childless, in a common accident and the evidence showed that the wife survived the husband by a day or even an
hour, the Act would not apply and his property would go to his wife's
relatives-something he may not have desired-resulting possibly in
multiple administrations. 67
To remedy this deficiency the Code provides a type of clause
frequently found in wills, namely that a person who fails to survive
the decedent by 120 hours shall be deemed to have predeceased
the decedent for purposes of intestate succession. 68 Thus an heir is
required to survive by five days in order to succeed to a decedent's
intestate property; and if it cannot be determined that he has survived
by that period because the time of the deaths cannot be ascertained,
then he is deemed not to have survived for the required period. The
section goes on to prevent the survivorship requirement from affecting
inheritances by the last eligible relative of the intestate in order to prevent escheat to the state. 69
PROTECTION

OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE

This is an area which the Code admits will be controversial.
Almost every state imposes some limitations upon a property owner's
freedom of testamentary disposition, in favor of a surviving spouse
who is permitted to claim a share in the decedent's estate. 70 The common law concepts of dower and curtesy form the historical basis of
survived the other, that the estate passed to the testator's next of kin, since the legatee's
next of kin could not sustain the burden of proving he survived.
67 An extreme situation occurred in Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961),
where the court held that evidence of the survival of one tenant by the entirety for a
short time after the other tenant, even for one second, was sufficient to negate the
Uniform Act's provision for an equal division of the property, so that the heirs of the
deceased wife who was held to have survived the husband when they were both killed
in an automobile collision took the entire property held by them as tenants by the entirety.
68 UPC § 2-104. The period was stated in "hours," apparently to avoid the difficulty
of computing days when different time zones are involved. Fratcher, supra note 6, at 7.
69 UPC § 2-104.
70 See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
33 U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1966), where the author questions the need for legislative restraints on the power of married persons to transfer their property as they please.
The married testator on the whole shows little inclination to avenge himself at
death for the slights and frictions of marital bliss ....
[T]he need for a surviving
spouse's choice between the deceased spouse's testamentary largess and the
legislatively-decreed share is not a need of massive proportions.
Id. at 715.
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protection afforded a surviving spouse. The essential features of common law dower have been preserved, with certain statutory modifications, in about one-half of the states. 71 In most of these states dower is
a life estate in one-third of the lands in which the husband had an
estate of inheritance during coverture, 72 but in a few of them, including New Jersey, the fractional share has been increased to onehalf.

73

Two factors militated against the preservation of dower and
curtesy in their original forms. First, they often proved to be serious
encumbrances on land, since they could not be lost without the consent of the spouse.7 4 Second, they failed to take account of an important incident of the change from an agricultural to an industrial
economy, namely that the main form of productive wealth was no
longer land but rather personal property, principally in the form of
securities and shares in industrial enterprises. Thus, the need to protect the spouse from being disinherited as to such property was recognized by a majority of states which enacted statutes permitting the
surviving spouse to elect to take a statutory share (typically one-third
of the estate) instead of the provision left her in the will.7 5 Most states
that afford the spouse this elective or "forced" share have abolished
dower and curtesy.76
The Code does this quite specifically7 7 and then proceeds to give
the surviving spouse an elective share of one-third of the augmented

estate.78 This concept of the "augmented" estate follows the pattern of
the recent New York legislation,79 which recognized that most statutes
gave the surviving spouse the right to elect to take a share of the decedent's "probate" estate but took no account of various will substitutes which enabled a property owner to transfer the economic
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.1 (1952).
Id.
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:35-1 (1953). To recover dower, a widow must prove first, a
valid marriage continuing to her husband's death and second, that he was seized of an
estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, however short, provided it was
not transitory in character. Heldhauser v. Schulz, 93 N.J. Eq. 449, 116 A. 791 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1922).
74 Demchak v. Kingsley, 90 N.J. Super. 190, 216 A.2d 753 (App. Div. 1966).
75 See, e.g., N.Y. ESr., POWERS & TRUsTs LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967), which gives
the surviving spouse the right to elect to take one-half of the net estate if no children
survive or, if there are children, one-third of the net estate.
76 See Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
77 UPC § 2-113.
78 UPC § 2-201.
79 N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUsrs LAW § 5-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967, Supp. 1970).
71 See
72
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benefits of ownership at his death without the use of a will and therefore without resort to probate.8 0
Thus, the Code extends the elective share of the surviving spouse
to certain non-testamentary transfers which are added to the net probate estate to arrive at the augmented estate, which is roughly similar
to the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. 8 l Included are such
will substitutes as transfers in which the decedent retained the possession of, enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property, or
a power to revoke, or to invade, or dispose of the principal for his
own benefit; property held in joint tenancy or by the entirety; and
transfers made within two years of the decedent's death provided the
transfers to any one donee in either of the years exceeds $3,000.82 Only

transfers made during the marriage are included, thus making it possible to provide for children by a prior marriage without fear that
such transfers will be upset by later marriage. s
However, gifts made to the surviving spouse during decedent's
lifetime and property received by her at his death from life insurance,
joint tenancy and other non-probate arrangements are added to the
augmented share before the surviving spouse's one-third share is computed, thus in effect requiring such assets to be brought into hotchpot,
and reducing her share of the augmented estate.8 4 The theory here is
to prevent the surviving spouse from electing and thereby disturbing
the decedent's testamentary plan when she has been well provided for
by the decedent by the transfers described above and has received a
fair share of his total wealth.
Thus, the Code achieves the dual purpose of preventing the
property owner from defeating the surviving spouse's right to an elective share by making non-probate transfers of his property, while at
the same time preventing the surviving spouse from electing when she
80 Attempts to defeat the statutory elective rights of a surviving spouse by inter vivos
transfers have been resisted by courts holding that such transfers constituted a "fraud"
on her rights where they were motivated by an intention to defeat her claim, Patch v.
Squires, 105 Vt. 405, 165 A. 919 (1933); or that they were "illusory" where the property
owner retained far too much control as in the case of a revocable living trust, Newman

v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937). But cf. In re Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100
N.E.2d 120 (1951), where the court held that a Totten or savings bank trust is not illusory
even though it has a strong testamentary flavor because the depositor retains complete
control and dominion over the deposit during his lifetime. See generally W. MACDONALD,
FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960), for a comprehensive look at the problem.
81 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2033-44.
82 UPC § 2-202(1).
83 Id. See also Comment to that section. This is new in the Code and different
from other similar legislation.
84 UPC § 2-202(2).
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has been adequately provided for."" In this latter respect, the Code is
different from the statutes of New York and other states where the surviving spouse's right of election is absolute without regard to provisions made for such spouse by the decedent. 8
Conflict of laws problems, resulting in complex litigation, 7 could
be avoided by uniformity in this area. The Code, perhaps anticipating
nonuniformity, declares that its provisions for surviving spouses apply
only to married persons dying domiciled in the enacting state, otherwise her right to an elective share in property in the state is governed
by the law of the decedent's domicile at death.88
EXECUTION AND REVOCATION OF WILLS

Execution
The General Comment accompanying this part of the Code states
that its basic intent is to validate the will whenever possible, with the
result that the formalities for a will are kept to a minimum. The Code
provides:
Except as provided for holographic wills .

.

. every will shall

be in writing signed by the testator or in the testator's name by
some other person in the testator's presence and by his direction,
and shall be signed by at least 2 persons each of whom witnessed
either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature
or of the will.8 9

This section appears to be patterned mainly on section 5 of the
English Statute of Frauds, 1677,90 which together with the Wills Act
85

UPC § 2-202, Comment.

86 See N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967, Supp. 1970); PA.

tit. 20, § 301.11(a) (Supp. 1970).
87 See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337
(1950); Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123 N.J. Eq. 481, 198 A. 885 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938).
88 UPC § 2-201. New York has a similar provision, N.Y. EsT., Powas & TRUSTS LAW
§ 5-1.1(d)(6) (McKinney 1967).
89 UPC § 2-502.
90 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 5 (1677):
[A]ll devises . . . of any lands . . . shall be in writing, and signed by the party
so devising the same, or by some other person in his presence and by his express
directions, and shall be attested and subscribed in the presence of said devisor
by three or four credible witnesses ....
The number of witnesses was reduced to two by the later English statute, infra
note 91, and that is the required number in all but six states (Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and South Carolina) which require three
witnesses. See Rees, supra note 3, at 624.
STAT. ANN.
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of 1837, 91 has influenced the legislation of all states excepting Louisiana. 92 New Jersey is one such state and its statute provides as follows:
Except as provided in section 3A:3-5 of this title, a will to be
valid shall be in writing and signed by the testator, which signature
shall be made by the testator, or the making thereof acknowledged
by him, and such writing declared to be his last will, in the presence
of 2 witnesses present at the same time, who shall subscribe9 their
names thereto, as witnesses, in the presence of the testator. 3
The exception referred to deals with wills made by members
of the armed forces. As of January 1, 1952, the cited statute abolished
the privilege extended to soldiers "in actual military service" or sailors
"at sea" of making oral wills of personalty.9 4 These expressions had
caused difficulty to the courts, which looked with disfavor on nuncupative or oral wills. 95 The present New Jersey statute renders valid a
will made by any person of eighteen years of age or upward while
in active military service as a member of the armed forces in time of
war or in time of "emergency" or in time of "warlike conditions" if it
is in writing., 6 It need not be signed, attested or bear any other formality.
Although the majority of states still permit oral wills of personalty,
whether of the nuncupative variety or of the soldiers' and sailors'
91 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict,, c. 26, § 9 (1837). This statute, which applied to wills of
real and personal property, introduced further formalities relating to the place of
testator's signature ("at the foot or end thereof"), the testator's signing in the presence
of two witnesses present at the same time, and the witnesses' subscribing the will in the
presence of the testator-all of which are ignored by the Code. The alternative of the
testator's acknowledging his signature to the witnesses is retained in the Code.
92 See 2 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS §§ 19.3, 19.4, 20.31 (3d rev. ed. 1960).
For a brief history of the English and New Jersey statutes, see 5 A. CLAPP, WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATION § 40 (3d ed. 1962).
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-2 (1953).
94 N.J. REv. STAT. § 3:2-7 (1937) (repealed 1951).
95 See In re Male's Will, 49 N.J. Eq. 266, 24 A. 370 (Prerog. Ct. 1892). In In re
Beck, 142 N.J. Eq. 15, 18, 58 A.2d 869, 871 (Prerog. Ct. 1948), the court said that the words
"in actual military service" meant that "[t]here must be a war, and the soldier in question
must, in fact, be engaged in carrying it on." But in In re Knight's Estate, 11 N.J. 83, 93
A.2d 359 (1952), the court indicated that there was no necessity that there actually be a
war and held that the benefit of the statutory exemption was available to a marine in
Korea without regard to whether the Korean conflict was a war or a police action. The
court also construed the then existing statutory provision for soldiers liberally to exempt the testator from the age requirement regarding testamentary capacity. Likewise, the
term "at sea," which did not require that the sailor's will be made in time of war, gave
rise to much difficulty of interpretation. See T. ATKINSON, WILLS 371 (2d ed. 1953).
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-5 (Supp. 1970). The terms in quotes refer respectively to
the Korean conflict and the Southeast Asia situation (the latter effective February 13,
1968).
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genre,9 7 the Code is completely silent on the question. This seems
strange in view of the liberal tendency of the Code to reduce formalities to a minimum.
In other respects many of the formal requirements for the making
of a will present in the statutes of most states, including New Jersey,
have been omitted in the Code. There is no requirement that the
testator publish the document as his will, although it should be
pointed out that this American innovation of publication or declaration is required in only a minority of states.9 8 There would seem to
be no pressing need to retain this requirement, especially since instruments in the form of inter vivos dispositions, often denied effect on
the ground that they are testamentary because they are not to take
effect until the death of the grantor9 9 or because too extensive powers
have been retained by a settlor,'0 0 could be upheld if they complied
with the formalities required by a wills act; yet they would still be
invalid under a publication requirement if the witnesses were not
informed that the instrument they were attesting is a will-which, by
hypothesis, they would not be. 101
As in New Jersey and twenty other states,'10 2 the Code provides for
acknowledgment by the testator as an alternative to signing the will
in the presence of the witnesses.'4 3 But whereas New Jersey and nine10 4
teen other states require the signature itself to be acknowledged,
97 See Rees, supra note 3, at 636-38.
08 T. ATKINSON, WILLS 327 (2d ed. 1953). The requirement appears to be construed
liberally. See In re Norswing's Estate, 47 Cal. App. 2d. 730, 733, 118 P.2d 858, 859 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941): "It is well settled that such a declaration need not be expressed in words,
but may be sufficiently indicated by the conduct and acts of the testator." A similar
thought was expressed in In re Hale's Will, 21 N.J. 284, 296, 121 A.2d 511, 518 (1956):
"Tihere must be some conscious indication by the testator, unmistakable in its import,
that the act he is about to perform is, or the act he has performed was, the signing of
his last will."
99 Butler v. Sherwood, 196 App. Div. 603, 188 N.Y.S. 242 (1921); cf. Abott v. Holway,
72 Me. 298 (1881), where the deed was held valid as presently creating a contingent
future interest in the grantee when it provided that it was not to take effect until
grantor's death and then only if he was survived by the grantee. The decisions are by
no means harmonious in this area. See Ballantine, When Are Deeds Testamentary?, 18
MICH. L. REv. 470 (1920).
100 See, e.g., In re Pengelly's Estate, 374 Pa. 358, 97 A.2d 844 (1953). But cf. Stouse v.
First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951). Here again there is a certain diversity of opinion, although the trend is in favor of upholding such trusts as valid inter vivos transactions.
See Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); REsTATEmNT (SECOND) TRUSTS
§ 57 (1959).
101 See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 1072.
102 See Rees, supra note 3. at 619-20; T. ATKINSON, WILLS 321-24 (2d ed. 1953).
103 UPC § 2-502.
104 This has been construed as requiring that the signature be visible to the
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the Code provides for another alternative, the testator's acknowledging
that the document is his will. 1 °5 New Jersey, along with five other

states, has the further restriction that the signature or its acknowledgment be made in the"presence of two witnesses "present at the same
time."' 106 There is no such requirement in the Code. Furthermore,
under the Code the witnesses need not sign in the presence of the
testator, as is required in New Jersey, or in the presence of each other,
as is the case in some other states.
Neither the Code nor New Jersey requires that the testator's
signature be at the end of the will; it may appear at the beginning,
side or back of the will.107 His signature may consist of a mark or any
visible impression as long as it is made with the intention that it constitute his signature. 08 The Code permits the will to be signed by another person signing the testator's name at his direction and in his
presence. New Jersey is one of only four states that do not permit
such signature by proxy. 10 9 This gives rise to some rather fine distinctions as to whether a signature was made by proxy or with assistance.
It has been held, for example, that the testator signed with assistance
rather than by proxy when he held the pen while another guided
his hand through the letters of his name. 110 But what of a person totally
paralyzed or armless-should he not be able to make a will?"' There
would seem to be no compelling reason for New Jersey to hold out on
this matter, if it were to take the road to uniformity.
As in twenty-two states, the Code permits a holographic will,
that is, one entirely in the handwriting of the testator, without the
need for attesting witnesses. 112 Difficulties have arisen where there are
some printed provisions in the will, as when a form is used, some
witnesses at the time of acknowledgment. In re Sage's Will, 90 N.J. Eq. 209, 107 A. 151
(Prerog. Ct.), afl'd, 90 N.J. Eq. 580, 107 A. 445 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
105 In this respect, it would seem that acknowledgment of the will is substantially
the same as publication, so that if the testator's signature is neither made nor acknowledged in the presence of the witnesses, he must at least publish his will in their presence
under the Code. See T. ATKINSON, WILLS 327 (2d ed. 1953).
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-2 (1953).
107 In re Phelan's Estate, 82 N.J. Eq. 316, 87 A. 625 (Prerog. Ct. 1913).
108 In re Will of Bullivant, 82 N.J. Eq. 340, 88 A. 1093 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913).
109 The others are Connecticut, Louisiana and Utah. See Rees, supra note 3,at 616.
110 Campbell v. McGuiggan, 34 A. 383 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1896).
111 It was suggested by way of dictum that a proxy signature might be permissible.
In re Will of Bullivant, 82 N.J. Eq. 340, 342, 88 A. 1093, 1094 (Ct. Err. & App. 1913):
The ordinary in that case [In re Will of McElwaine, 18 N.J. Eq. 499 (1867)] was
dealing with a signature made by another and he properly dwelt on the danger
involved, and'intimated that even that would suffice if done in the testator's
presence and by his express direction.
112 T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 75 (2d ed. 1953); Rees, supra note 3, at 634.
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courts disregarding the printed matter as surplusage when the handwritten provisions can be given effect without it, l l 3 other courts insisting that as long as the testator intended the printed matter to be part
of his will it could not be upheld as a valid holograph 1 14 The Code
sensibly avoids this issue by specifically providing that the will is
valid as a holograph if the signature and the material provisions are
in the handwriting of the testator."1 5 Thus, no harm is done by executing such a will on a printed will form as long as the handwritten portion makes sense without the printed portion. Although at present no
legal significance is attached to a holographic will in a majority of
states, it seems that such a will should be optional for those persons
unable or even unwilling to avail themselves of legal advice, especially
since having the greater part of the will in the testator's own handwriting would appear to be as effective a bar to fraud as the witnessing
of a testator's signature or acknowledgment thereof.
In keeping with modern policy in many areas, the Code states a
minimum age of eighteen for capacity to make a will. "1 There is an
amazing diversity in this field of testamentary capacity ranging from
a minimum age requirement of fourteen in one state to eighteen years
in seventeen states and twenty-one years in about sixteen states, with
the age being lowered for married persons and members of the armed
forces under some of the statutes. 117 In view of the general trend
toward lowering the voting age to eighteen, there would seem to be
no strong policy for New Jersey not to reduce the present minimum
age requirement from twenty-one"18 to eighteen, especially since uniformity here seems most desirable.
With regard to the qualification of witnesses, the Statute of Frauds
requirement that the witnesses be "credible""i 9 was construed to mean
that the will was void if a necessary witness was incompetent to testify
where, for example, he had a pecuniary interest in establishing the
113 E.g., In

re Parsons' Will, 207 N.C. 584, 178 S.E. 78 (1935),

under a statute

requiring that the "will and every part thereof" be in the handwriting of the testator.
114 E.g., In re Wolcott's Estate, 54 Utah 165, 180 P. 169 (1919), under a statute
defining "[a]n olographic will [as] one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the
hand of the testator himself." Id. at 166, 180 P. at 170.
115 UPC § 2-503.

116 UPC § 2-501.
117 See Rees, supra note 3, at 653-55.
118 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-1 (Supp. 1970). Under this statute a minor, regardless of
age, may provide in his will for the appointment of a testamentary guardian. Another
exception is provided for members of the armed forces who are at least eighteen years

of age. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-5 (Supp. 1970). See note 96 supra.
119 See note 90 supra.
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will.12o Thus a devisee or legatee or their spouses could not be witnesses
without rendering the will invalid. The situation was remedied early
by an English statute of 1752121 and later by the Wills Act of 1837122
which specifically provided that a will would not be void if attested
by an interested witness, but at the same time forfeited the gift left to
the legatee or devisee who witnessed the will. Forty-two states, including New Jersey, 123 have statutes substantially similar to the English
statutes. Under most of them (not including New Jersey) the interest'
of the devisees or legatees will not be avoided if there are otherwise
enough competent witnesses.1 24 Again, under most of the statutes (but
not including New Jersey's) provision is made for the situation where
the witness is one who would have taken had the testator died intestate; the most usual type permits him to receive what he would have
taken in the absence of the will, that is, it voids the excess over the
intestate share.1 25 Both these provisions are found in the Model Probate Code and were retained in the first tentative draft of the Revision
126
of that Code.
The Uniform Probate Code, however, has seen fit to depart from
all of the above by providing that a gift under a will to a witness
is no longer invalidated. 127 While explaining in the accompanying
120 Holdfast v. Dowsing, 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1746). The common law rule
rendering persons interested in the outcome of litigation incompetent to testify in
judicial proceedings has been changed by statute in nearly all of the states. See 2
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 576 (3d ed. 1940).

121 25 Geo. II, c. 6, §§ 1, 2 (1752).
122 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict., c. 26, §§ 14, 15 (1837).
123 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-6 (1953) provides:

No person who has attested a will shall be incompetent to testify concerning
the execution thereof by reason of his being a beneficiary thereunder; but whether
or not he testifies, as to him and those claiming under him, any beneficial devise,
legacy . . . , except a charge on real property for the payment of a debt, shall
be void.
The statute has been held not to apply to a legatee whose spouse had attested the
will, nor to disqualify an executor who had witnessed the will. Lippincott v. Wikoff, 54
N.J. Eq. 107, 33 A. 305 (Ch. 1895).
124 Rees, supra note 3, at 629-34. But in New Jersey it has been held that, even if
he is a superfluous witness, he still forfeits his interest, the prohibition being absolute
under the terms of the statute. Patanska v. Kuznia, 102 N.J. Eq. 408, 141 A. 88 (Ch. 1928),
aff'd per curiam, 104 N.J. Eq. 202, 145 A. 921 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929).
125 Rees, supra note 3, at 632. But in New Jersey, by another provision, the witness
whose interest is voided may not receive any gift or compensation from the estate or
otherwise. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-7 (1953). This seems unnecessarily harsh, and New
Jersey appears to stand alone in this respect. The other two states, Alaska and Oregon,
which have a similar statute, based on the Statute of George II, except the witness'
intestate share from the blanket prohibition.
126 See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 1069-71.
127 UPC § 2-505.
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Comment that the purpose of the change is not to foster the use of
interested witnesses and expressing the hope, or rather expectation,
that attorneys will continue to use disinterested witnesses, the Code
states the rationale to be the need not to penalize "the rare and
innocent use of a member of the testator's family on a home-drawn
will."128 In most cases, however, such a person would be one who
would take on intestacy so that under the prevailing statutes, including the Model Probate Code, his interest would not have been
forfeited. Many legislatures might regard this change as an unnecessary or ill-advised one.
Because of a conflict in the laws of the various states as to the
execution of wills, a will must often satisfy the formal requirements
of two or more states, unless the common law principles of choice of
law 1 29 in this area have been modified by statute' 30 -which they have
not in New Jersey. Perhaps anticipating lack of uniformity for some
time to come, the Code broadens the scope of validity of out-of-state
wills by providing that a written will is valid if its execution complies
with the law of the place where it was executed at the time of execution, or of the law of the place where at the time of execution or at
the time of his death the testator was domiciled, had a place of abode
or was a national. 131 This is designed to provide for situations not
covered by other statutes, notably the problem of the refugee or
emigrant who has abandoned one domicile and not yet obtained another. 13 2 The Comment to this section points out, somewhat optimistically, that its impact will become minimal when the Code is widely
adopted.
Finally, with regard to execution of wills, the Code provides for
a more formal method of execution in the so-called self-proved will. 13 3
The testator is permitted to acknowledge and the witnesses to declare
by affidavit, before a public officer such as a notary, in a prescribed
form, that all the formalities of execution (including, in this case, a
14
declaration that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator)"
were complied with. When this document, including the public
Id., Comment.
See notes 4 and 5 supra.
180 The common law principles have been so modified by legislation in thirty-two
states. Rees, supra note 3, at 905.
131 UPC § 2-506.
132 Fratcher, supra note 6, at 1072-73.
138 UPC § 2-504.
184 A formality not required by the general section on execution of wills. See note
91 supra.
128
129
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officer's certificate, is annexed to the will, the will may be admitted
to probate without the testimony of any subscribing witness. Since
informal probate is permitted under the Code in any event, 135 the
only significance of the self-proved will is the procedural advantage
it is accorded in formal probate proceedings wherein the testimony
of any witness is dispensed with. 1 6
Revocation
The three methods for the revocation of a will are generally recognized to be: (1) by a subsequent writing (either another will or codicil)
which revokes the prior will or part of it expressly or by inconsistency; (2) by a physical act to the will, such as burning, tearing, cancelling or obliterating the same, performed by the testator or by
another person in his presence and by his direction; and (3) by implication of law due to changes in the circumstances of the testator. 3 7
The first two methods are substantially stated in the statutes of
nearly all states, including New Jersey'38 and the Code.1 39 As with
the legislation on execution of wills, these statutes are derived from
the Statute of Frauds 1 40 and the Wills Act of 1837.141 Again there
appear to be variations of detail among the statutes, especially with
regard to the physical acts required for revocation. 142 Every state
185 UPC §
136 UPC §

3-303.

3-406(b). If the will is not self-proved, the testimony of at least one
attesting witness is required when such evidence is needed in a contested case. UPC
§ 3-406(a).
137 T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 84 (2d ed. 1953).
138 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-3 (1953). These two methods of revocation must be
carefully distinguished. For example, if a notation appears on the side or back of a will
stating that the will is revoked or cancelled but does not physically come in contact with
any part of the written words of the will, it cannot be given effect as a revocation by
physical act (cancellation) and would not be a revocation by subsequent instrument
unless it complied with the formalities for a written will. In re Danielly, 14 N.J. Super.
238, 81 A.2d 519 (Cty. Ct. 1951). See also In re Parker, 47 N.J. Super. 241, 135 A.2d 678
(App. Div. 1957).
139 UPC § 2-507.
140 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 6 (1677):
[N]o Devise in Writing of Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, nor any Clause
thereof, shall at any Time . . . be revocable, otherwise than by some other Will
or Codicil in Writing, or other Writing declaring the same, or by burning,
cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same by the Testator himself, or in his
Presence and by his direction and consent ....

The New Jersey statute is almost identical, except that it specifies that any other writing
which revokes the will must be executed in the same manner required by the law for
wills. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-3 (1953).
141 7 Will. IV & 1Vict., c. 26, § 20 (1837). This statute omitted cancelling and obliterating as physical acts of revocation, prescribing "burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying"
as the permissible acts.
142 See Rees, supra note 3, at 871-80.
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except one (Tennessee) provides for revocation by a subsequent writing, and a few states specifically provide that a subsequent incon4
sistent will revokes a prior will to the extent of the inconsistency,' 3
although this is generally held to be so by implication. 44 The statutes of almost all states either permit or are construed as expressly
authorizing partial revocation by physical act. 145 Thus uniformity
in the area of revocation should not be difficult to achieve, and the
Code provides a traditional and acceptable formula.
When it comes to revocation by operation of law there is a wide
diversity of provisions, the grounds for such revocation being mar1 47
riage (following the Wills Act of 1837), 146 divorce, or birth of issue.
The Code rejects marriage and birth of issue as grounds of revocation and provides that only a divorce or annulment (but not legal
separation or any other change of circumstances) shall operate as a
revocation of any disposition or appointment of property in favor
of the former spouse, including his or her appointment as a fidu148
ciary.
The basis for the objection to marriage as a ground for revocation is that the spouse is given adequate protection both by her right
to an elective share 149 (already discussed), as well as by another section
providing that if a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving
spouse who married him after the execution of the will, the omitted
(or really pretermitted) spouse shall receive his or her intestate share
unless it appears from the will that the omission is intentional or
the testator made lifetime transfers to the spouse that were intended
to be in lieu of any testamentary provision. 15 0 The effect of this section, it is pointed out, could also be to reduce the number of instances where a spouse would claim an elective share.
Likewise the birth of issue is not made a ground of revocation,
143

Id. at 874-75.

144 See Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 988 (1911); In re Drake's Will, 15 N.J.

Misc. 484, 192 A. 428 (Orphans' Ct. 1937), which held that where two wills were wholly
inconsistent the second will alone was to be probated even though its practical effect
would be purely revocatory since the beneficiary under it predeceased the testator. But
see Austin v. Oakes, 117 N.Y. 577, 597-99, 23 N.E. 193, 197 (1890), where it was said that if
it appeared that the testator would have preferred the disposition made by the earlier
will to an intestacy, the second will would be deemed to have revoked the earlier one
only insofar as it is effective.
145 Rees, supra note 3, at 879-80.
146 7 Will. IV & 1 Vict., c. 26, § 18 (1837). This Act expressly abolished all types of
revocation other than those provided for in the statute.
147 Rees, supra note 3, at 880-81.
148 UPC § 2-508.
149 UPC § 2-201.
150 UPC § 2-301.
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as it is in New Jersey,' 51 apparently because another section of the
Code, similar to a statute in New Jersey, 1 52 provides that if a testator
fails to provide in his will for any of his children born or adopted
after the execution of his will, such omitted (really pretermitted)
child receives a share in the estate equal to what he would have received if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears from the
will that the omission was intentional, 153 or the testator made lifetime transfers to the child that were intended to be in lieu of any
testamentary provision. 54 This is the same as in the case of the
omitted spouse. A further exception to the operation of this section
of the Code is where the testator at the time of the execution of the
will had one or more children and left substantially all his estate to
the surviving parent of the omitted child. 55 This exception, absent
in the New Jersey statute, 5 is a most salutary one because otherwise,
it is submitted, the statute can be a trap for the unwary testator whose
intention to leave his entire estate to his spouse would be defeated
by his unwittingly playing favorites with an after-born child if he
did not think of inserting a saving clause in the will. The New Jersey
statute should be amended to read like the Code, even before the
latter's possible adoption.
It is also believed that there is no compelling reason to retain
the statute that provides for revocation of the entire will, with resulting total intestacy, upon the subsequent birth of a child when
the testator had no child living at the time of the execution. 57 Thirtyseven states make some provision for the child born after execution
of the will. New Jersey is one of only seven states that permit complete revocation when no other children were living at the time the
will was executed. 5 True, the operation of this statute may also be
negated by either providing for or mentioning the after-born child
or children. But where this is not done, does it not seem harsh to
151 N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 3A:3-10 (1953).

152 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-11 (1953).
153 E.g., a clause such as "I intentionally make no other provision for any children

of mine now living [mentioning them by name if any are living] or any children hereafter born to or adopted by me or for any other issue of mine," would negate the
operation of the statute. In re Estate of Campbell, 71 N.J. Super. 307, 310, 176 A.2d
840, 842 (Cty. Ct. 1961). The court held that a provision in the will on a contingency
which never occurred is sufficient to prevent the statute from becoming operative.
154 UPC § 2-302(a)(3).
155 UPC § 2-302(a)(2).
156 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-11 (1953).
157 N.J. STAT. ANN. § SA:3-10 (1953).
158 See Rees, supra note 3, at 895.
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have the testator die intestate and possibly defeat his testamentary
plan when the other statute, 159 similar to that of forty other states
and the Code, adequately protects the pretermitted after-born child?
It should be pointed out, in passing, that the Code makes one
further provision for the protection of children, namely, in the comparatively rare situation where a testator fails to provide for one of
his existing children because of a mistaken belief that the child is
dead; such child would then take an intestate share. 60 Perhaps the
Code, in accordance with its professed design to avoid litigation
wherever possible, should have indicated whether the mistake had to
appear on the face of the will or could be proved outside the will.
Permitting the latter would impose an unnecessary burden on the
courts by rendering the effect of the mistake on the will highly spec61
ulative.'
Revival of a Revoked Will
No discussion of revocation would be complete without touching
on the doctrine of revival. The question arises as follows: a first will
is executed and then revoked by a second will; the second will itself is then revoked. What is the effect of the revocation of the second
will upon the first will? Is the first will revived? The answer depends
mainly upon the view the court takes as to the effective time of
revocation of the first will by the subsequent will, and partly upon
the admissibility of evidence to show the testator's intention. 62
The common law courts took the position that the revoking will,
like any will, was ambulatory and took effect only at the testator's
death; hence it had no effect on the first will until the time of death,
and if it was not then in existence because of being revoked, the first
will was allowed to stand.68 Thus the first will was automatically
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-11 (1953).
160 UPC § 2-302(b).
161 See Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 102 (1852), where the court said:
It is very apparent ... that the testatrix would have made the same will, had she
known her son was living. She did not intend to give him anything, if living.
But if this were not apparent and she had made the will under a mistake as to
the supposed death of her son, this could not be shown dehors the will. The
mistake must appear on the face of the will, and it must also appear what
would have been the will of the testatrix but for the mistake.
162 See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 92 (2d ed. 1953); Evans, Testamentary Revival, 16 Ky.
L.J. 47 (1927).
163 Goodright v. Glazier, 98 Eng. Rep. 317, 319 (K.B. 1770), where Lord Mansfield
said:
A will is ambulatory till the death of the testator. If the testator lets it stand
till he dies, it is his will: if he does not suffer it to do so, it is not his will. Here,
he had two. He has cancelled the second: it has no effect, no operation; it is
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revived and no evidence of a contrary intent was admissible. A number of courts have applied this common law rule of automatic re64
vival.1
Other courts, including New Jersey's, have adopted the view
developed by the ecclesiastical courts that revocation of the first will
took place upon the execution of the second will, but if the testator
65
showed an intention to revive the first will, it would be given effect.
In other words, no presumption of revival was indulged; the proponent of the first will had the burden of establishing an intent to
66
reinstate that will.
The Code has, in effect, adopted the ecclesiastical rule. 1 67 There
is no revival unless the testator shows such an intent either from the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the revocation of the second
1 68
will or from testator's contemporary or subsequent declarations.
But if the second will is revoked by a third will, then the testator's
intention to reinstate the first will must appear from the terms of
the third will. 169 There should be no difficulty in adopting the above
as a uniform rule, as a solution to resolving the conflict among differ70
ent jurisdictions.
Mention should be made here of a related doctrine under which,
also, a: revoked will may ultimately be given effect, namely the doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation.171 This was a common law
development and the Code has not seen fit to provide for it, although
there is a basic conflict as to one aspect of the doctrine. Simply
stated, the rule is that where the revocation of a will and the making
as no will at all, being cancelled before his death. But the former, which was
never cancelled, stands as his will.
It is not clear whether Lord Mansfield had the doctrine of revival in mind.
164 See, e.g., Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, 118 A. 454 (1922).
165 See, e.g., Heise v. Earle, 134 N.J. Eq. 393, 35 A.2d 880 (Ct. Err. & App. 1944).
166 It has been held that the careful preservation of an earlier will after the revocation of a later will would be evidence of a testator's intention to revive the earlier
will. Randall v. Beatty, 31 N.J. Eq. 643 (Prerog. Ct. 1879).
167 UPC § 2-509.
168 UPC § 2-509(a).
169 UPC § 2-509(b).
170 Another reason for uniformity is that some courts have created further refinements in the doctrine, distinguishing between revocation by inconsistent provisions
and revocation by an express revocatory clause in the subsequent instruments. It has
been said that the inconsistent will does not operate as a revocation upon its execution
whereas an express revocation revokes the prior will immediately. See Poindexter v. Jones,
200 Va. 372, 106 S.E.2d 144 (1958), commented on in 46 VA. L. Rev. 373, 387 (1960); In re
Noon's Will, 115 Wis. 299, 91 N.W. 670 (1902).
171 See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 88 (2d ed. 1953); Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARv. L. Rav. 337 (1920).
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of a new one are parts of one scheme, and the revocation of the old
will is so related to the making of the new one as to be dependent
on it, then if the new will is not made or, if made, is invalid, the
old will, though revoked, should be given effect. 172 It is a doctrine
of presumed intent and is sometimes spoken of as a conditional revocation. But more accurately it is a case of the testator's revoking a
will while laboring under a mistake of law or fact in connection
therewith, and this is the one part of the law of wills where the
173
courts have given relief for mistake.
It is sometimes difficult to determine whether the doctrine applies, as, for example, in the situation where a part of a will is cancelled or obliterated (assuming partial revocation by physical act is
permitted) and it is accompanied by the interlineation of a substitute
provision which is ineffective because not properly executed. Should
the doctrine be automatically applied or should it depend on the
174
testator's probable intention?
Again, there is a conflict of authority as to whether the doctrine
applies only when the mistake is intrinsic to the document, that is,
where the defect appears on the face of the instrument; 175 or whether
it is inapplicable when the provision in the subsequent revoking will
fails for a reason outside the instrument, as for example when a testamentary gift to a charity in a codicil fails because the testator died
within the statutorily prescribed time (e.g., thirty days) after the
172 McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 71, 47 S.E. 501, 503 (1904). The rationale
of the rule is stated in the leading English case of Onions v. Tyrer, 24 Eng. Rep. 418, 419
(Ch. 1716): The cancellation of the first will, although ordered by the testator, "depended
on the validity of the second will, and ought to be taken as one act done at the same
time, so that if the second will is not valid, as the testator thought it was, and without
which he would not have cancelled the first, the cancelling the first will, depending
thereon, ought to be looked upon as null also, and therefore the first will as to the said
lands, is still subsisting and unrevoked."
173 See note 171 supra.
174 See In re Bonkowski's Estate, 266 Mich. 112, 253 N.W. 235 (1934), where the
testator struck out one name and inserted another to receive the legacy, but the insertion
was ineffective for lack of proper execution; the doctrine was applied and the will as
originally written was probated. But cf. Ruel v. Hardy, 90 N.H. 240, 6 A.2d 753 (1939),
where the testatrix struck out "five" in a five hundred dollar legacy and inserted the
word "one" without proper attestation; the court held that a reduction of the legacy
by eighty percent showed a preference of the testatrix to revoke the legacy unconditionally, and refused to apply the doctrine. There would seem to be no difficulty in applying
the doctrine if the converse had occurred, namely substituting by unattested act a
larger amount in place of the cancelled legacy. See In re Shuler's Will, 45 N.J. Super.
209, 132 A.2d 33 (App. Div. 1957).
175 See, e.g., In re Braun's Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948), where the gift
in the codicil revoking a bequest to the same person failed because the amount of the
gift was left blank.
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codicil was executed. On this latter point the cases are in disagreement. 176 For the sake of uniformity the Code should have taken a
177
position on this.
RELATED NON-STATUTORY PROBLEMS

There are a number of questions in the law of succession that are
not, in most jurisdictions, covered by statute. A common law has
developed in such areas as the generally accepted grounds for the
contesting of a will, namely fraud, duress, undue influence and mental
disability. Here there is substantial uniformity and therefore no necessity for statutory coverage. In other areas such as the incorporation
of unattested documents into a will, contracts relating to testamentary
power, problems of construction, including lapse, ademption and
class gifts, the effect of homicide on succession, and non-probate
transfers such as joint tenancies and tentative trusts, there is considerable diversity of opinion. In order to achieve uniformity the Code
should, and does, cover these areas of disagreement which are generally not the subject of statutory enactment.
Incorporationof UnattestedDocuments
There are two doctrines here by which an unattested document
may be referred to in a will to complete its meaning without repeat176 See In re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 323, 91 A. 679, 681 (1914), where the
court said that the authorities "all recognize a clear distinction between failure of the dispositive part of the revoking instrument because of a defect in the instrument and
failure because of extrinsic circumstances; and there is entire concurrence of view that in
the former case the revocation is inoperative, while in the latter [gift to charity void
because of death of testator within 30 days] it must prevail." Contra, Linkins v. Protestant
Episcopal Cathedral Found., 187 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1950), where the court admitted
extrinsic evidence of the mistake and applied the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
177 For those jurisdictions having restrictions on testamentary gifts to charity where
the testator dies within a certain time after the execution of the will, the type of statute
enacted in Florida, by amendment, might provide a solution. The statutory amendment
provides that charitable bequests are not voidable by certain classes of heirs, even though
the last will be enacted within six months (one month in some other states) of the
testator's death, if the testator "by his will duly executed immediately next prior to
such last will and more than six months before his death, made a valid charitable
bequest or devise in substantially the same amount for the same purpose or to the same
beneficiary . ... " FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (1964). This statute was construed strictly, however, when the last two wills had been executed within six months of testatrix's death,
even though she had two earlier wills executed more than six months before her death,
all containing the same charitable bequest; the court refused to admit evidence of the
mistake. In re Blankenship's Estate, 122 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1960).
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ing all the terms in the will. These are Incorporation by Reference
and Reference to Facts of Independent Significance.
Under the doctrine of Incorporation by Reference, a document
is considered as part of the will for certain purposes only, mainly to
construe the particular provisions of the will. The paper need not be
present at the time of execution of the will, and need not be probated with the will. It is metaphorically incorporated into the will.178

Because of the danger of fraud which the wills acts were designed to
1 79
prevent, a few jurisdictions have refused to recognize the doctrine.
In the remaining jurisdictions, the courts have hedged the doctrine
with rather stringent requirements which are interpreted quite nar0
rowly on occasion.8
Three conditions are generally recognized as necessary for an
effective incorporation: (1) the will must describe the writing with reasonable certainty; (2) the writing must have been in existence when the
will was executed; and (3) the writing must be referred to as being in
existence.' 8 ' The Code states the doctrine without this last requirement.
It provides that any writing in existence when a will is executed may be
incorporated by reference if the language of the will manifests this
intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit its identifica18 2
tion.
Of far greater importance from an estate planning standpoint
is the doctrine of Facts of Independent Significance. All states recognize that meaning can be given to a will by reference to facts having
178 See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 80 (2d cd. 1953); 2 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON
WILLS §§ 19.17-19.36 (3d rev. ed. 1960); Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and Incorporation by
Reference, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 635 (1949).
179 Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A. 1058 (1907); Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq.
681, 121 A. 525 (Ch. 1923); Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
Doubt was expressed as to whether the doctrine obtained in New Jersey in a comparatively recent case; see Clark v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A.2d 108 (Ch.
1955), where the court appeared to have misunderstood the correct nature of the doctrine.
180 See, e.g., Bryan's Appeal, 77 Conn. 240, 246, 58 A. 748, 750 (1904), where the court
in refusing incorporation, to complete a legacy testator left his wife "in trust . . . for the
purposes set forth in a sealed letter which will be found with this will," stated: "There is
not in the language quoted . . . any clear, explicit, unambiguous reference to any specific document as one existing and known to the testator at the time his will was executed." Three years later the Connecticut court squarely rejected the doctrine in Hatheway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A. 1058 (1907).
181 Wagner v. Clauson, 399 Il. 403, 409, 78 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1948). See also authorities cited note 178 supra. Sometimes a court refused incorporation when the words used
in the will could be construed as referring to either a future or a past writing, as in the
case of Magnus v. Magnus, 80 N.J. Eq. 346, 84 A. 705 (Ch. 1912), where the will left property to a niece to be disposed of "in accordance with my instructions to her."
182 UPC § 2-510.
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Thus a testa-

mentary disposition whereby property is left to the trustee of a previously created trust, although the terms of the trust are not repeated
in the will, is upheld on the ground that the existing inter vivos trust
is a fact of independent significance. 8 5 This is the so-called "pour86
over" trust, a common and useful estate planning device.'
Where the inter vivos trust is subject to amendment or modification and the settlor by a will subsequently executed disposes of property in accordance with the terms of the inter vivos trust as amended
from time to time, and after the execution of the will he amends the
trust, most courts have held that the property passing under the will
should be disposed of in accordance with the terms of the unamended
trust instrument, i.e., as it existed at the time of the execution of the
will.187 A few courts, influenced by Professor Scott, hold that the prop-

erty bequeathed to the trustee should be disposed of in accordance with
the amended terms, i.e., as the inter vivos trust exists at testator's
death.8 8 This view was adopted by a number of states by statute, 8 9
and found formal expression in the Uniform Testamentary Additions
to Trusts Act of 1960,190 which has been adopted in twenty-four
192
states, 191 including New Jersey which follows the Act very closely.
183 See Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REv. 521,546 (1930).
184 See Evans, Incorporation By Reference, Integration, and Non-Testamentary Act,
25 COLUM. L. REv. 879, 891 (1925).
185 Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 A. 822 (Ch. 1926); In re Rausch's
Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932); In re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d 282
(1949). In this last case it was held that the property left by will to the trustee of the
inter vivos trust became a part of the res of such trust and was not to be administered as
a testamentary trust.
186 See Polasky, "Pour-Over Wills": Use with Inter Vivos Trusts, 17 Sw. L.J. 410
(1963).
187 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935); Koeninger
v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934).
188 Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350
(1960); Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961). See also A. ScoTr,
TRUSTS § 54.3 (3d ed. 1967).
189 See Polasky, "Pour Over" Wills and the Statutory Blessing, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES
949,(1959).
190 9C UNIFORM LAws ANN. 168-70 (Supp. 1967).
191 A. ScoTt, TRUSTS § 54.3, at 409 (3d ed. 1967).
192 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3A:3-16.1 to 16.5 (Supp. 1970). The statute, applicable to wills
executed on or after Feb. 28, 1963, follows the Uniform Act very closely. It codifies the rule
of pour-over trusts propounded in Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 A. 822
(Ch. 1926). It provides, further, that the property devised or bequeathed shall become
part of the trust to which it is added (and not a testamentary trust to be administered
separately) and also that such property shall be disposed of according to the provisions
of the inter vivos trust including any amendments made after the execution of the will.
Furthermore, the pour-over trust is upheld even though the inter vivos trust contains
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The Code, likewise, has adopted the Act,0 3 and uniformity might be
achieved here before it is in other areas covered by the Code.
There is an innovation in the final section of this topic, as part
of the broader policy of relaxing formalities of execution and thereby
effectuating a testator's intent. The Code permits a will to dispose
of certain tangible property, such as jewelry, by reference to a list
made before or after execution of the will, provided the list is in the
handwriting of the testator or signed by him and it describes the
items and the beneficiaries with reasonable certainty. The writing
may even be altered by the testator after its preparation. 94 Thus the
doctrine of incorporation by reference is virtually nullified in this
situation. The section has the advantage, as has been pointed out,
of permitting a testatrix to change her mind as often as she pleases
as to who shall eventually get her earrings, without bothering her
95
lawyer.
Contracts Concerning Succession
A person may bind himself by contract to make a testamentary
disposition of his property or to refrain from exercising his testamentary power.196 A problem arises as to whether the courts will imply
a contract from the existence of joint or mutual wills 97 where, because of reciprocal provisions in such wills, there would seem to be
some coordination in their execution. The weight of authority appears to be that the mere presence of either joint or mutual wills
does not raise any presumption that they were executed in pursuance
of a contract. 9 8 Another problem with regard to such wills concerns
their revocability-in the absence of an agreement, will the courts
imply a contract not to revoke such wills? Again it is generally held
only a nominal amount of property. And, finally, a revocation or termination of the
inter vivos trust before the testator's death causes the bequest or devise to lapse.
193 UPC § 2-511, the terms of which are substantially the same.
194 UPC § 2-513.
195 See Fratcher, supra note 6, at 8.
196 See generally T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 48 (2d ed. 1953); B. SPARKS, CONTRAcrS TO
MAKE W11 s (1956).
197 A "joint" will is one in which the same instrument is executed by two persons
as their respective wills, whereas "mutual" wills are the separate wills of two persons
containing reciprocal provisions. T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 49 (2d ed. 1953). See also In re
Opper, 31 N.J. Super. 508, 107 A.2d 348 (App. Div. 1954) (discussing the legal effect of a
joint will).
198 Loflin v. Capps, 327 P.2d 443 (Okla. 1958); and see B. SPARKS, supra note 196, at
27-28. Some courts, while paying lip service to the rule, tend to find a contract on little
or no evidence other than execution of the joint or mutual wills. See Rich v. Mottek,
11 N.Y.2d 90, 181 N.E.2d 445 (1962).
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that the mere execution of mutual wills is not sufficient evidence
of a contract not to revoke. 199 In the case of a joint will, because of its
very nature (two persons executing a single instrument as their will)
some courts permit a presumption to arise that each party had contracted not to revoke the will without the consent of the other.20 0
The Code, indicating a need to tighten the methods by which
contracts concerning succession may be proved, states specifically
that the execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create
a presumption of a contract not to revoke the wills.20 1 The section
goes on to provide that a contract to make a will or not to revoke one
can only be established either by the will itself setting forth the
material provisions of the contract, or by the will making express
reference to the contract with extrinsic evidence proving the terms of
the contract, or by a separate writing signed by the decedent evi20 2
dencing the contract.
Thus the problems of proof so often associated with such contracts are somewhat alleviated. Quite often a contract to leave one's
property by will is made in consideration of the promisee's rendering
personal services for a stated period such as the remainder of the
promisor's life, and the contract typically will be oral. Questions of
enforceability arise which might depend upon a writing required
by a Statute of Frauds or sufficient acts of part performance. Sometimes, even when there are acts of part performance, such as the
rendition of the services, the courts will deny the equitable relief of
quasi specific performance 20 3 if adequate compensation for those acts
can be given on a quantum meruit basis. 20 4 It would seem that the
't~te,
199 Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914); In re Rosenblath'i-'
146 Misc. 424, 263 N.Y.S. 303 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
200 Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N.E. 216 (1909); cf. Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo.
482, 165 S.W. 1027 (1914). The disadvantages and hardships of such a rule are effectively
pointed out in Fratcher, supra note 6, at 1081.
201 UPC § 2-701.
202 Id.
203 So called because specific performance in this context is a misnomer, inasmuch
as the court cannot compel the execution of a will during the promisor's lifetime nor
can it prevent him from revoking a will made in compliance with the contract. Instead,
the remedy is a constructive trust in favor of the promisee upon property passing from
the testator-promisor in violation of his agreement. See Note, The Contractual Will and
Some Consequences of its Breach, 34 VA. L. REv. 590 (1948). See also Woll v. Dugas, 104
N.J. Super. 586, 250 A.2d 775 (Ch. 1969), afj'd per curiam, 112 N.J. Super. 366, 271 A.2d
443 (App. Div. 1970).
204 See Cooper v. Colson, 66 N.J. Eq. 328, 58 A. 337 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904). In a recent New Jersey case, the court took a liberal view toward the promisees (stepson and his
daughter) who had rendered services in exchange for an oral contract to make a will
leaving them the bulk of the promisor's estate, pointing out that the fact that the prom-

1971)
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Code, besides specifying the method of proof of such contracts, should
have furnished some definite standards for determining the remedy
to be granted.
It is difficult and perhaps artificial to separate the substantive
law of wills from the procedural or probate aspects of it, and exclusions of certain topics may seem arbitrary. But if any conclusion
is possible at this juncture, it is that hopefully there has been demonstrated that even in the law of succession, quite apart from the whole
process of administration which the Code deals with at great length
(to be discussed in a later paper), there is a compelling need for
uniformity. Adoption of the Code, even with slight local variations,
might be a salutary step in that direction.
isees had testified that they would have continued to perform the services even in the absence of the decedent's promise to bequeath her estate to them did not preclude their
right to specific performance of the contract. Klockner v. Green, 54 N.J. 230, 254 A.2d 782
(1969). The court said:
Who can value the worth to a lonely person of having a loved one available
at the slightest moment of anxiety, or at the most trivial moment of need? The
law furnishes no standard whereby the value of such services can be measured.
It is incumbent on equity, therefore, to accept the estimate of their value made
by the party requesting the services by decreeing specific performance of the
agreement.
Id. at 237, 254 A.2d at 785.

